Though
clouds and thunderstorms had been
forecast, it was a clear evening as
American flight 383 descended into
Cincinnati the night of November 8, 1965.
On the flight deck was Captain Bill
O'Neil, Check Captain David Teelin, and
Flight Engineer John Lavoie. Along with
three flight attendants, there were 56
passengers on board the Boeing 727 inbound
from New York. Clouds and lightning were
seen to the north as 383 descended through
5,000ft, making a left downwind for runway
18. At this point, the crew reported to
Cincinnati Approach that they had the
airport in sight and would like to make a
visual approach.
Approach
control approved the visual approach,
clearing 383 to 2000ft and reporting
precipitation to the west of the airport
moving south. 383 was then instructed to
contact the tower and, upon doing so, the
tower reported the aircraft in sight and
cleared it to land. The tower then
reported that the precipitation had moved
over the airport and light rain was
falling. When asked if it still had the
runway in sight, the crew replied
"Ah...just barely...we'll pick up the ILS
here." The tower told 383 that all of the
airport lights had been turned up high to
which the crew replied "OK." Just a few
seconds later, 383 flew into the west bank
of the Ohio river, exploding and killing
all but three passengers and a flight
attendant.
......
Examination of the wreckage showed
that the aircraft had impacted the river
bank at 665ft, which was 225ft lower than
airport elevation. The aircraft was in a
level attitude and configured properly for
landing. No evidence of equipment
malfunction could be found. Examination of
the ATC radar tapes showed areas of rain
in the vicinity of the airport. It
appeared that 383 crashed just prior to
entering the leading edge of one of the
areas. One survivor of the crash reported
that, while it wasn't raining when he
exited the aircraft, a heavy rain began
almost immediately after. Witnesses
reported seeing the aircraft flying low
over the river valley and apparently in a
gradual descent. A pilot of a small
aircraft inbound from the north reported
that conditions were visual to the north
but there were thunderstorms to the west
and a line of rain over the river valley
to the north of the airport with low-lying
clouds. Recovery of the aircraft's FDR
showed that the aircraft was stabilized at
2,000ft while flying downwind.
As it
turned for a left base, it began a descent
at about 800fpm. About half a minute
before impact, descent rate increase to
over 2,000fpm until just before impact
when it was brought back to around 600fpm.
One contributing cause of the accident was
obviously the crew's inability to
stabilize it's approach. Entering the
downwind with excess speed, they were
unable to complete configuration changes
until turning the base leg when company
profiles stipulate that nearly all the
configurations should have been completed
before the base leg, giving the crew more
time to concentrate on flying the
aircraft. However, even this non-standard
approach should have been possible for
such an experienced flight crew.
Clearly,
the weather at the time played an
important role. In visual conditions on
downwind, the aircraft would have entered
the area of low-lying clouds and rain as
it crossed over the river and turned base.
The thunderstorms to the northwest may
have obscured this weather, making it
difficult to see. Upon entering the rain,
the crew may have attempted to descend
below it in order to keep the airport in
sight until it descended below the top of
the river bank.
Also
attributed to the accident was improper
crew co-ordination. American requires that
altitude and airspeed be called out by the
non-flying pilot whenever the aircraft is
500ft or lower above the airport. Also,
the descent rate should be called when it
exceeds 700fpm after this point. The FDR
showed that the aircraft's descent rat
exceeded this throughout the time it was
below 500ft above the airport, indicating
that either Teelin didn't make the proper
calls or was not monitoring the
instruments. With the less than adequate
visual conditions, both pilots may have
been looking out the window to maintain
visual contact, thinking the other was
monitoring the instruments. It was
concluded then, that improper crew
co-ordination in conjunction with
deteriorating weather led to the crash of
flight 383.