Early
on the morning of November 28th, 1979, Air
New Zealand Flight 901 departed Auckland
carrying 237 passengers and 20
crewmembers. This was no ordinary flight
however. Flight 901 was to carry it's
passengers on a 12 hour Antarctic journey,
flying over either Ross Island and Mt.
Erebus or the South magnetic pole and
Ninnis glacier, dependent on weather
conditions upon arrival before returning
to Auckland.
The flight was set up
with a party-like atmosphere, a bar and
catering were provided and passengers were
invited to roam the aircraft in search of
the best views. Flight deck visits were
encouraged and experts on the Antarctic
were onboard to provide commentary as
well.
......Captaining Flight 901 would be Jim
Collins, a 15 year pilot with Air New
Zealand having over 11,000 hours. With him
were First Officer Greg Cassin and two
flight engineers. All of the crew had been
thoroughly briefed on the special
procedures used for this route. The DC-10
used on the route was equipped with INS
for use over the long water legs to the
Antarctic. After leaving New Zealand, the
only ground-based navigational facility
would be the NDB at the U.S. Navy's
McMurdo Station (Mac Centre) near Mt.
Erebus. The crew had also been briefed on
the use of Grid Navigation which would
become necessary beyond 60 degrees of
latitude due to the convergence of lines
of longitude nearing the pole. The plan
was to cruise at 35,000 until contacting
Mac Centre and the making a descent for a
better view based on reported weather.
......Four hours out of Auckland and at
FL350 feet, the first glimpses of white,
icebergs drifting in the ocean, were
visible from the windows. Shortly after,
Captain Collins was able to make contact
with Mac Centre for a weather report.
McMurdo was reporting some clouds with
bases at 3,000ft and 40 miles visibility
below the clouds. Based on the report and
what he saw from the aircraft, Collins
decided to continue on towards McMurdo
Station. About an hour later with Flight
901 paralleling the Antarctic coast, the
clouds at McMurdo had dropped to 2,000 but
visibility was still good.
901 was still in the
clear, so Collins asked for a descent and
was cleared to 18,000 feet. About 40 miles
north of McMurdo, 901 was still in the
clear and was approved for a visual
descent at the captain's discretion. At
this point, Flight 901 had not yet been
picked up on Mac Centre's radar. Collins
reported that they were descending to
10,000 feet at which point they wanted a
radar vectored descent through the clouds.
Mac Centre was still unable to acquire
901, but upon reports that the flight was
still clear of the clouds, 901 was cleared
to continue a visual descent and proceed
to McMurdo Station.
The last report heard
from Flight 901 was that they were
descending through 6,000 feet for 2,000
feet and still in visual conditions.
Minutes later, Mac Centre called back 901
several times to confirm that they had
reached 2,000 feet, but there was no
response.
......Rescue planes and helicopters were
dispatched from McMurdo Station and at
12:56 am, 11 hours after the last contact
with Flight 901, a C-130 Hercules radioed
Mac Centre reporting that they had located
the wreckage just north of McMurdo Station
on the slope of the 12,450ft Mt. Erebus at
a height of only 1,500ft. Experts from
around the world dispatched immediately
for McMurdo Station to assist in the
recovery and investigation. Especially
anxious to see the wreckage was
McDonnell-Douglas, having lost another
DC-10 in the American 191 accident just
six months earlier.
The first investigators
were taken to the site by helicopter and
it became immediately apparent that,
unlike American 191, Flight 901 impacted
the ground in a nearly level attitude,
apparently under control. The length of
the crater and wreckage trail indicated
that the DC-10 impacted at high speed,
followed by a fire. Once investigators
were able to reach the crash site, they
were able to determine that there were no
survivors. Because the flight was a
sight-seeing tour, several roles of film
and video tapes were recovered from the
wreckage that helped investigators put
together the chain of events. Most
important, though, were the FDR and CVR.
......It became
apparent that during 901's descent, two
orbits were made, one to the right and
then to the left, in order to keep the
aircraft in a clear area north of McMurdo
in hopes that they could get below the
base of the clouds and then proceed
visually to McMurdo. On rolling out of the
second orbit, 901 was descending through
5700ft for 1500ft on a course direct to
McMurdo Station, which they believed to be
still 30 miles south. Only three minutes
later the aircraft's GPWS sounded and
shortly after the aircraft impacted the
ground, still doing 260 knots. Just before
impact, Captain Collins had called for
go-around power and the aircraft had
rotated into a climb attitude.
Navy crews in the area
at the time of the accident reported that
the cloud bases were about 3,500ft, with
layers obscuring Mt. Erebus and the ground
definition poor. The tragedy was this, for
14 months prior to the accident, the
co-ordinates of McMurdo Station were
improperly entered on the flight plan
route. This had been inconsequential for
previous flights as they had all been able
to make a visual descent into the area
without having to enter clouds. The error
was corrected the night before flight 901
departed, but the crew was not briefed on
the change. With McMurdo properly
identified, the new flight plan would take
901 directly over Mt. Erebus.
The crew still believed
that they would be flying into the bay to
the west of Mt. Erebus, so they felt no
danger in making a descent. McMurdo
Station was not notified of the minimum
safe altitudes for 901, so they did not
question the Captain's decision to descend
in what he reported as visual conditions.
The lack of awareness of flight plan
changes, together with without, were cited
as the cause of the accident. Sadly, media
and political pressures brought the brunt
of the blame on the flight crew for
descending when they did. However, without
the knowledge of the changed flight plan,
it seems hardly fair to say that the same
choice would have been made if the crew
had all pertinent information.