It was
a typical summer afternoon on the Gulf
coast on July 9, 1982 when Pan Am flight
759 was preparing to depart New Orleans enroute to Las Vegas. Scattered clouds lay
below thunderstorms and rain showers
throughout the area. On the flight deck
was Captain Kenneth McCullers, First
Officer Donald Pierce, and Flight Engineer
Leo Noone. Along with 136 passengers,
there were four cabin attendants onboard
the Boeing 727. Just after the doors were
closed on the aircraft, a heavy rain began
to fall. As 759 taxied out to runway 10,
the current ATIS was reporting the wind
calm. Before reaching the departure end of
the runway, Pierce asked again for the
current wind, which was now 040 at 8kts.
Now at the departure end of the runway,
the controller announced that the winds
had become 060 at 15kts, with gusts to
25kts.
He also announced a low-level windshear
alert with winds at the northeast end of
the field from the north at 10kts and from
the southeast at 3kts in the northwest end
of the field. Pierce gave another call as
759 waited to take the runway, learning
the wind was now 070 at 17, the controller
saying "...appears the front is passing
overhead right now...we're right in the
middle of everything." Just after an
incoming aircraft had touched down, 759
was cleared for takeoff. As 759 was
starting it's roll, the controller advised
an inbound aircraft that the previous
aircraft had encountered a 10kt windshear
on final.
Fully loaded, flight 759 finally lifted
off nearly 7,000ft down the runway. After
climbing to about 100ft, the aircraft then
began to sink. Still in a nose-up attitude
of about 10 degrees, the aircraft
disappeared behind trees and exploded into
a huge fireball. The aircraft had impacted
in a residential area, destroying houses
and cars for nearly three city blocks. All
144 aboard the aircraft and 8 on the
ground were killed.
......The damage to the aircraft was so
extensive that little could be revealed
about the aircraft's condition at the time
of the accident. However, investigators
were able to determine that the flaps and
slats were extended properly. Also, the
engine gauges revealed that the engines
had all been set to a high EPR at the time
of the crash. No evidence of engine
malfunction could be found. Recovery of
the FDR showed that everything was
functioning normally throughout the short
flight. The CVR was badly distorted, but
with noise filtering, some of the
recording was decipherable. After learning
of the low-level windshear alert, the
McCullers told Pierce to "Let your
airspeed build up on takeoff" and
suggested they turn off the air
conditioning packs for takeoff, allowing
them to get a higher EPR from the engines.
McCullers also suggested that they turn
slightly to the left on takeoff to avoid
the worst of the weather.
The aircraft began it's takeoff roll
with Pierce flying, McCullers calling out
the airspeed. Twelve seconds after
rotation, McCullers said "Come on
back...you're sinking Don...come on back!"
Another twelve seconds later, the GPWS
sounded and the aircraft impacted the
ground at 149kts. More than 100 people
witnessed 759's short flight and provided
valuable insight as to the cause. Only
four people saw lightning at the time and
said it was not in the vicinity of the
crash. Only one person reported hearing
thunder. Reports varied about the
intensity of the rain, but all seemed to
agree that it was at least moderate.
Reports of the wind direction and velocity
also varied, but many described it as
gusty and variable. The aircraft that
departed prior to 759 on runway 10
reported a storm cell directly over the
airport.
Another aircraft which departed runway
19 prior to 759 also reported several
storm cells all around the airport, the
largest lying to the east-northeast which
had a gradient which "was very steep". The
Captain of the aircraft reported that they
encountered heavy rain and windshear
during the takeoff roll. The aircraft
drifted towards the runway edge and the
Captain elected to rotate the aircraft
early to avoid going off the runway.
However, the next aircraft to depart 19
reported neither turbulence nor windshear.
A business jet waiting for takeoff at
runway 19 just prior to the accident
reported seeing two cells of severe
intensity just east of the airport, each
of which were some 4nm in diameter. The
crew reported that these cells had been
the reason why they had not elected to
depart runway 10. About an hour before the
accident, the Centre Weather meteorologist
called the tower to advise them of intense
thunderstorms with lightning, severe
turbulence, and wind gusts southwest of
the airport.
He advised the tower that they were
moving northeast and to "keep an eye on
them." This warning however was only to
alert the controllers of possible delays
on departure and arrival and the tower was
not required to pass this information on
to flight crews. Collection of radar
images at the time of the accident showed
level 3 or greater storm cells to the east
of and over the departure end of runway
10. Rainfall gauges near the departure end
indicated a rate of over two inches/hour
but could have reached upwards of nearly
six inches/hour.
Two seconds after the accident, there
was another windshear alert. Based on the
sensor data, it was estimated that 759
initially encountered a 14kt headwind
which changed to a 5kt tailwind near the
departure end. This 19kt difference
occurred in less than 1nm. Witnesses on
the ground reported wind strength of even
greater magnitude than was recorded by the
sensors, indicating the shear could have
been as great as 40kts. Based on the
meteorological data, investigators
concluded that 759 encountered a
microburst, penetrating the centre of it
just after rotation where it then
encountered a decreasing shear of 48kts as
it flew into the backside, encountering
downdrafts of around 600feet/minute.
Investigators also concluded that, given
the limited visual cues available due to
the heavy rain, the actions of McCullers
and Pierce were as prompt as could be
expected. Evidence at the crash site
indicated that they had actually stopped
the descent and entered a slight climb
just prior to hitting trees.