There were 57
people aboard the DC-9 as it began it's ILS approach to runway 18R.
A windshear alert was issued as 1016 began it's descent down the
glideslope. As the crew neared the airport, they encountered the
windshear and decided to execute a missed approach. As they rotated
the aircraft to go around, they turned slightly to the right.
Passing the airport, the aircraft continued to descend. It struck
trees and telephone poles before impacting the ground. 37 people
were killed.
......It was clear that 1016 had
encountered thunderstorm and microburst activity. Severe weather lay
over the airport and along the approach path at the time of the
accident.
The airport was scheduled to have terminal
Doppler radar installed, but it was behind schedule and not
functional the the time of the accident. Had it been, more pertinent
information would have been available to the crew concerning the
existing conditions.
Another indicator of the lack of significant
weather information being disseminated to the crew was their
decision to turn right during the execution of the missed approach.
The airport's Doppler radar showed that the weather was actually
worse on that side of the runway. Throughout the last moments of the
flight, 1016 encountered a windshear of an incredible 61kts.
The aircraft's onboard software was not advanced
enough to recognize windshear in a timely manner, preventing the
crew from being able to make a more pertinent decision. The airport
did have surveillance radar, but ATC procedures did not require the
controllers to alert crews as to developing weather, including two
other windshear alerts which had occurred prior to the accident. The
crew's go-around procedure was begun correctly, the aircraft's nose
rotated up, but the power was not advanced. That, together with the
increasing tailwind, caused the aircraft to approach a stalled
condition. The crew then lowered the nose to avoid the stall but
their descent rate increased, causing them to impact the ground.
Investigators cited USAir's inconsistent training
procedures regarding windshear penetration and missed approach
procedures which were not resolved by the FAA.